3 | DELVING INTO PEACE POLITICS AND ELECTION

Assessing the progress under the official roadmap of the GPH-MILF Peace Process—guided by the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)—reveals a stark contrast between a highly successful Political Track and a deeply strained Normalization Track. As the region prepares for the historic, repeatedly postponed BARMM Parliamentary Elections now scheduled for September 14, 2026, the status of their achievements reflects both monumental institutional milestones and fragile security bottlenecks.

The Political Track has achieved structural triumphs, beginning with the 2019 ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) which replaced the old ARMM with an empowered BARMM. Under the interim leadership of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), led by MILF Chairman Ahod "Al Haj Murad" Ebrahim, core legislation like the Bangsamoro Electoral Code was passed, establishing a unique parliamentary framework where half of the 80 seats are allocated to regional political parties. This track has successfully facilitated a transition to demilitarized politics, with the MILF forming its own political vehicle, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), to participate in institutional, democratic competition rather than armed conflict.

The UBJP will complete with 16 Regional Parliamentary Political Parties (RPPPs) that were officially registered and granted accreditation for the upcoming parliamentary elections, with 13 political parties actively appearing on the final ballot after the last-minute disqualification of the Moro Ako Party on August 4, 2026, according to official data from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and state security frameworks. These participating parties are fielding 454 candidates to compete via a proportional representation system for 40 of the 80 available seats in the incoming Bangsamoro Parliament. 

Conversely, the Normalization Track remains heavily delayed and stands as a major point of friction due to a standstill in decommissioning. While the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) successfully processed 26,145 fighters during Phases 1 to 3, the MILF Central Committee suspended Phase 4, leaving roughly 14,000 combatants and 2,450 weapons un-decommissioned. The MILF asserts that the Government of the Philippines (GPH) has failed to fully deliver agreed-upon socioeconomic and alternative livelihood packages to help previously decommissioned fighters transition to civilian life, a setback compounded by slow progress in transforming six major MILF camps into socioeconomically integrated civilian zones.

To safeguard the region's 2.39 million voters against severe underlying security threats, the government has mobilized an extensive multi-agency force led by the Philippine National Police (PNP), which has deployed 9,435 personnel consisting of 4,361 local officers and 5,074 augmentation forces from national tactical groups like the Special Action Force. This police contingent is heavily backed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which has positioned five regional joint task forces alongside specialized armor deployments—such as Task Force 92 from the 1st Brigade Combat Team in Maguindanao—while the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) patrols porous inter-island channels to block private armed groups and illegal weapons shipments ahead of the polls.

As some aspects of the Normalization Track was not completed, the upcoming elections are being conducted in an environment heavily saturated with un-decommissioned weapons, prompting the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to classify over 108  out of 119 administrative units of concern due to threats from active clan feuds (rido), private armed groups, and splinter insurgencies. 

In joint analyses published by IAG, experts warned that the ongoing impasse on Phase 4 of decommissioning "sinks any hope of a peaceful parliamentary election". The MILF Central Committee formally paused the decommissioning of the remaining 13,855 combatants and 2,575 weapons. Chief Negotiator Mohagher Iqbal stated that peace cannot come from elections while the harder parts of the settlement remain undone. The MILF maintains that the GPH has failed to deliver functional, long-term socioeconomic reintegration packages to the 26,145 combatants who already surrendered their weapons in Phases 1–3.

Further,  acknowledging that most former combatants are now between 50 and 65 years old, making standard technical-vocational training impractical, GPH Panel Chair Mel Senen Sarmiento disclosed to MindaNews that the government is seeking to overhaul the socioeconomic package. The panel is actively exploring a dynamic, monthly conditional stipend model inspired by Colombia's peace framework to break the normalization deadlock. That is yet to be realized.

Meanwhile, Comelec color-coded critical in a threat matrix which are heavily concentrated across the mainland provinces. Category Red, representing the highest risk with a combination of active armed threats and a severe history of election violence, covers 26 areas, with an extreme concentration of 21 jurisdictions located in Lanao del Sur due to entrenched political rivalries.

The remaining red-tagged zones are distributed across Maguindanao del Norte, Maguindanao del Sur, Basilan, and the Special Geographic Areas. Category Orange, denoting serious concerns from the active presence of private armed groups or residual extremist insurgencies, encompasses 23 areas, led primarily by 11 jurisdictions in Maguindanao del Sur, followed by volatile municipalities in Basilan and Maguindanao del Norte. 

Category Yellow covers 41 areas monitored closely for a documented history of partisan unrest, family rivalries, or minor poll disturbances rather than active warfare. Conversely, Tawi-Tawi stands as the only province in the BARMM completely cleared of security watch classifications, with all of its jurisdictions designated under Category Green due to a stable, peaceful local environment.

The IAG has explicitly cautioned that assurances from armed groups promising not to use their firearms to intimidate voters are "dubious and unreliable". This reality was underscored just days before the election on September 2, when an armed, uniformed convoy of the MILF's Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) was flagged by a joint military-police team in Lanao del Norte due to a failure in coordination mechanisms, highlighting the volatile peace on the ground.

To mitigate these vulnerabilities, the GPH and MILF Peace Implementing Panels signed the "Guidelines for Mutual Understanding for Ceasefire-Related Functions". This emergency safeguard tasks the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) with enforcing strict ceasefire protocols, including prohibiting MILF forces from wearing uniforms, setting up independent checkpoints, or carrying firearms outside their camps. Thus, while the peace process has successfully transformed a decades-long secessionist insurgency into a functioning autonomous democracy, its long-term stability hinges entirely on whether the post-election government can successfully resolve these lingering normalization disputes.

According to MindaNews, the region is tracking 2.4 million registered voters across 105 municipalities. A key political milestone occurred when the IAG, in collaboration with Notre Dame University, organized the First Bangsamoro Election Debate. This event brought together representatives from all 13 recognized Regional Parliamentary Political Parties (RPPPs) to present structural platforms on economy, security, and governance. 

Following with the foregoing situations, the following can be inferred:

1. The transition from an armed secessionist movement to a parliamentary democracy represents a massive structural achievement, anchored by the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) and the active participation of 13 registered political parties. However, this political stability is highly fragile due to an internal organizational split within the ruling Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), alongside a reduction of its nominees in the transitional parliament. This fragmentation has intensified rivalries with entrenched traditional political dynasties, who continue to exert heavy influence over local governance. As such, the political landscape remains tense due to deep-seated anxieties over recent Supreme Court rulings on redistricting and a history of consecutive election postponements that have strained public trust in the transition.

2. The economic baseline for long-term regional development remains fundamentally bottlenecked by delays in the Normalization Track. The MILF’s suspension of Phase 4 of decommissioning—affecting roughly 14,000 combatants—stems directly from the government's failure to fully deliver promised socioeconomic reintegration packages and sustainable civilian livelihoods. Because many former fighters are now between 50 and 65 years old, standard technical-vocational training has proven ineffective, forcing the government to explore alternative monthly conditional stipend models inspired by international peace frameworks. This lack of economic security leaves many base commands isolated and vulnerable, while uneven access to campaign finance further distorts the democratic playing field in favor of wealthy elites.

3. The social fabric of the region is defined by its diverse "Tri-People" population—comprising Muslims, Non-Moro Indigenous Peoples (such as the Teduray), and Christians—whose equitable representation is a core promise of the new parliamentary system. Despite this inclusive design, deep-seated social anxieties persist as marginalized communities, particularly indigenous groups and displaced survivors of the Marawi siege, continue to navigate socio-economic exclusion. These long-standing grievances are heavily exacerbated by tribalism, partisan polarization, and the constant psychological threat of localized violence, which challenges the social cohesion necessary for a peaceful democratic transition.

4. Technology plays a dual role as both a tool for democratic engagement and a vector for institutional instability. On the positive side, open-source initiatives and media-led collaborations have successfully hosted historic public election debates, providing voters with unprecedented access to party platforms and alternative information. Conversely, the region's weak communications infrastructure limits the equitable reach of these digital platforms. This digital divide is further complicated by the proliferation of online misinformation, political echo chambers, and sophisticated propaganda, which exploit local tribal and political divisions to manipulate voter sentiment.

5. The geographic and environmental layout of the BARMM directly shapes its security and electoral logistics. The region’s porous inter-island channels and rugged mainland terrain make monitoring exceptionally difficult, providing natural cover for splinter insurgencies and the movement of illicit goods. This complex geography has forced the Philippine Coast Guard to establish strict naval grids to blockade private armed groups and intercept illegal weapons shipments. Additionally, the region remains highly vulnerable to climate-induced disruptions and extreme weather events, which threaten to severely disrupt voter turnout and complicate the delivery of election logistics across isolated communities.

6. The legal architecture of the election is strictly defined by the Bangsamoro Electoral Code, which institutionalized a unique proportional representation system allocating half of the parliament's 80 seats to regional parties. To preserve the legality and neutrality of the polls amid high security risks, the GPH and MILF Peace Implementing Panels legally bindingized the "Guidelines for Mutual Understanding for Ceasefire-Related Functions." This framework empowers the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) to enforce strict, legally mandated ceasefire protocols. These laws strictly prohibit MILF forces from wearing uniforms, carrying firearms outside their camps, or setting up independent checkpoints, ensuring that regional autonomy does not unlawfully devolve into a localized military oligarchy. 💜

References:

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Dito Sa PH. (2025, July 15). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has suspended the decommissioning of its remaining 14,000 combatants [Status update]. Facebook. https://facebook.com

Eurasia Review. (2026, September 4). BARMM's first parliamentary elections: Securing peace, countering terrorism and consolidating governance twenty-five years after 9/11 – Analysis. Eurasia Review. https://www.eurasiareview.com/04092026-barmms-first-parliamentary-elections-securing-peace-countering-terrorism-and-consolidating-governance-twenty-five-years-after-9-11-analysis/

MindaNews. (2025, July). MILF stops decommissioning of remaining 14,000 combatants. MindaNews.com. https://mindanews.com/top-stories/2025/07/milf-stops-decommissioning-of-remaining-14000-combatants/

Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity. (2026, August). GPH-MILF peace implementing panels reconvene, announce resumption of normalization activities. Peace.gov.ph. https://peace.gov.ph/2026/08/gph-milf-peace-implementing-panels-reconvene-announce-resumption-of-normalization-activities/

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Philippine Daily Inquirer. (2024, May). GPH, MILF sign pact for peaceful BARMM polls. Inquirer.net. https://www.inquirer.net/486890/gph-milf-sign-pact-for-peaceful-barmm-polls/

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