9 | Proving Voter-Resilient Early Warning System in BARMM’s Multi-Hazard Grid for Democratic Electoral Shift
The historic first regular Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) parliamentary election on September 14, 2026, represents a monumental shift from appointed governance to a fully elected parliamentary system, yet it faces deep structural risks from political polarization, clan feuds (rido), and localized violence.
Analyzing this transition through core political and electoral theories and actions reveal how a pro-active Multihazard Early Warning System (MHEWS)—integrates weather, physical, and digital threat tracking—is vital to safeguarding democratic integrity before, during, and after the vote.
Parliament's election in a multi-hazard grid
The application of MHEWS is of high relevance because the region is exposed to a variety of natural and human-induced hazards that may affect communities, transportation, communication, infrastructure, and public services during election. Flooding, landslides, severe rainfall, strong winds, earthquakes, coastal hazards, and extreme heat can potentially disrupt normal activities. In addition, election-related operations may face logistical, transportation, communication, and security challenges. As elections require the coordinated movement of voters, election personnel, equipment, supplies, and other resources, even a localized disaster can potentially create significant operational difficulties. A multi-hazard approach therefore provides a way to anticipate these risks and prepare appropriate responses before they become critical.
As an integrated system, MHEWS is designed to detect, monitor, assess, and communicate information about different types of hazards so that individuals, communities, and institutions can take appropriate action before a disaster or conflict cause serious damage or loss of life. Unlike a conventional warning system that focuses on a single hazard, a multi-hazard system considers several threats, such as typhoons, heavy rainfall, flooding, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, storm surges, extreme heat, and other emergencies. The main objective is not simply to inform people that a hazard or a latent conflict is occurring or expected to occur, but to determine where the hazard or confict may have an impact, identify the people and infrastructure that may be affected, and provide clear information about what actions should be taken. This approach is closely related to the impact-based forecasting and early-warning approach being developed in the Philippines, which emphasizes communicating not only what the weather will be but also what the expected weather conditions may do to communities and critical infrastructure.
Hence, while political groups recalibrate their strategies on the eve of parliament's election, a pro-active MHEWS mitigates framework shocks by mapping geopolitical flashpoints, uses all collaborative mechanism and digital tracking to counter targeted disinformation and media manipulation, and analyzes past conflict data to pre-emptively deploy security personnel to high-risk areas.
The 2026 BARMM Parliamentary Election on September 14, provides an important context for applying such a system which will involve millions of registered voters, thousands of precincts, and numerous municipalities and cities across the region. The geographic and operational scale of the election makes disaster preparedness and real-time situational awareness particularly important. MHEWS could support election authorities by identifying areas where hazards are likely to interfere with polling operations, transportation routes, election facilities, communication systems, and the movement of election personnel and materials. Instead of treating a weather forecast or earthquake alert as an isolated piece of information, the system could connect hazard information with election-related geographic and operational data to determine the possible consequences for specific polling areas.
Election physical assessments and weather forecast
Prior to election, authorities identified which communities, polling centers, roads, bridges, communication facilities, and other critical infrastructure are exposed to different hazards.
Geographic Information System (GIS) technology was used to overlay hazard maps with the locations of polling centers, transportation routes, evacuation centers, hospitals, and other essential facilities. For example, if a polling center is located in a flood-prone area and can only be reached through a road that frequently becomes impassable during heavy rainfall, that location can be classified as a higher operational risk. This information can then be used to develop contingency plans before election day.
It integrates information from relevant scientific and government agencies, including weather forecasts and warnings from PAGASA, earthquake and tsunami information from PHIVOLCS, geological and hazard information from other appropriate government agencies, and local observations from disaster risk reduction and management offices. Local governments and barangays can also contribute information regarding road conditions, flooding, damaged infrastructure, and other emerging problems. The integration of these different information sources would allow authorities to establish a more comprehensive picture of conditions across BARMM for impact forecasting and flexibility.
For instance, the PAGASA-DOST and the Commission on Elections (Comelec) have already issued explicit weather safety and operational guidelines, which are being heavily reinforced by the region's expanding, community-backed Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) networks to combat parallel security and environmental hazards. In terms of weather, the state bureau projects cloudy skies with scattered rainshowers and thunderstorms driven by the Southwest Monsoon (Habagat), bringing high humidity, sudden afternoon downpours, and severe warnings for possible flash floods or landslides in the critically watched provinces of Cotabato, Maguindanao, Basilan, and Lanao del Sur. Voters are strongly advised to prepare for unpredictable rainfall by bringing rain gear like umbrellas or raincoats, carrying sufficient water to prevent dehydration during long waits in the heat, factoring in major travel delays caused by mud-choked provincial roads, and continuously monitoring local disaster office updates.
On election day, structural democratic legitimacy relies heavily on voter turnout, which can drop sharply if the physical or psychological "cost" of voting—driven by intimidation or violence—outweighs its perceived utility. An active MHEWS addresses this by enabling real-time tactical interdiction does to physical threats like booth-capturing or rido, while simultaneously providing transparent safety alerts that reassure voters, secure travel corridors, and systematically preserve the high turnout required for a legitimate system-wide mandate.
By historical election observations, post election environment warn that entrenched oligarchies and armed factions fiercely resist being displaced by narrow margins of victory, threatening to reject macro-political settlements. A functional MHEWS counteracts this elite backlash by continuously tracking inflammatory rhetoric online to suppress post-election flashpoints, heavily monitoring canvassing centers and Automated Counting Machine (ACM) transit lines to prevent physical sabotage, and compartmentalizing localized anomalies to ensure that isolated grievances do not escalate into a broader collapse of the region's peace architecture.
Hazards and latent conflicts: testing MHEWs capacities as election monitors
Early-warning information is useful only when it reaches the people and institutions that need it in time.
During BARMM election, warnings could be communicated through several channels, including mobile phones, SMS, cell broadcasting, radio, social media, official government communication channels, local disaster risk reduction offices, barangay officials, and other appropriate public communication mechanisms. Multiple communication channels are important because some geographically isolated communities may experience weak cellular signals, power interruptions, or other communication difficulties. Warning messages should also be clear, understandable, localized, and translated or communicated in appropriate languages when necessary.
This complex atmospheric vulnerability directly exacerbates the region's human-induced security threats, making the integration of the regional EWER network vital to maintaining peace before, during, and after the vote. This election will indeed be a test of MHEWS capacities.
Early Response Network (ERN) and other primary election watchdogs indicate that a highly effective Multihazard Early Warning System (MHEWS) relies on rigorous, predictive simulation testing across physical, technical, and digital spheres. ERN, alongside organizations like Climate Conflict Action Asia (CCAA), continually stress-tests its specialized Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) protocol through artificial "live-data inputs," measuring exactly how fast field observers report localized anomalies, how rapidly hubs verify threats like rido (clan feuds), and how efficiently actionable advisories reach deployed security units.
In parallel, digital watchdogs like the Incident Early Warning and Monitoring Center (IEMC-BARMM) spearheaded by the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) and the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (LENTE) validate both actual election and cyber-information ecosystems. They execute deep-scraping algorithmic tests to track keyword saturation and run simulated "coordinated inauthentic behavior" drills to optimize how quickly deepfakes and volatile rumors can be flagged and neutralized before causing real-world panic.
On the eve of the election, IEMC-BARMM shared to internal observers the latest conflict data based on Critical Events Monitoring System which recorded recorded 685 incidents of tension and violence from January to September 12, nearly half of which occurred after the filing of candidacies on May 5. Gun-related violence also increased despite the implementation of the gun ban, with incidents rising from 44 to 58 and deaths from 34 to 39 in the 45 days before and after the ban. IEMC likewise noted the nearly 20,000 security personnel deployed across the region—which they considered an unprecedented effort to secure the polls. For them, the greater test, however, may come after election day, as political rivalries, contested results, and shifting security dynamics could test the stability of the peace process.
Simultaneously, citizen watchdogs such as the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) and the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) audit the technical and administrative machinery by monitoring COMELEC mock and during actual elections and verifying the Final Testing and Sealing (FTS) of Automated Counting Machines (ACMs). This structural audit ensures that remote transmission frameworks can successfully withstand network failures or physical sabotage.
The super structure of government and civil society for election monitoring would likely be boosted by community-based Bangsamoro Ministry of Public Order and Safety (MPOS), which was funded through the Special Development Fund (SDF) mandated by Article XIV, Section 2 of the Bangsamoro Organic Law. These EWER platforms have systematically expanded to build an operational buffer against electoral violence aside from natural hazards. Since launching its Conflict Reporting System (CRS) in 2023 across 10 local government units, MPOS has steadily scaled up operations, training 450 Community Protection Monitors alongside hundreds of UN-supported community-based trainers. By early 2025, MPOS aggressively expanded these capacities—training 80 community members in Maguindanao del Sur's conflict-affected enclaves of Datu Salibo and Mamasapano in January, another 110 participants in Guindulungan and Datu Saudi Ampatuan in February, and 24 community focal leaders in Basilan in April—on its path toward mobilizing 720 EWER volunteers across 24 conflict-affected communities while structurally rewarding the 10 best local EWER frameworks.
Decentralized system of early warning system
Operating as a decentralized network, the EWER system bridges local civil society organizations, community watchdogs, the Philippine National Police (PNP), and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to detect, track, and prevent electoral violence before it triggers systemic setbacks. Its operational value lies in using grassroots indicators—such as localized hate speech, suspicious movement of firearms, and intense partisan standoffs—to deploy instant community mediation or pre-emptive security forces.
Within this operational framework, the MHEWS grid focuses heavily on mitigating three distinct human-induced hazards that traditionally disrupt local polls. First, the system monitors high-profile target ambushes and inter-factional friction, relying on localized intelligence networks to predict and neutralize retaliatory actions among command structures before they mobilize on polling day. Second, it counters the weaponization of clan feuds (rido); while standard military checkpoints catch loose firearms, they cannot track social escalation, prompting EWER trackers to watch for grassroots indicators—like families suddenly fleeing their homes or an abrupt halt in communication between local elders—so community peace-advocates can step in with traditional mediation before violence shuts down a voting center. Third, the network mitigates coercion and political intimidation in isolated territories, particularly in geographically isolated and swampy enclaves where state security forces have a sparse physical footprint; because vulnerable populations often hesitate to report intimidation directly to formal police units due to fear of reprisal, community-based EWER volunteers act as safe, anonymous conduits, ensuring that both weather and human-induced hazards are effectively managed to safeguard the democratic transition.
Succinctly, the system operates in layers. The first layer consist of hazard intelligence from scientific and government agencies. The second layer integrate geographic and risk information, including polling centers, roads, bridges, communities, evacuation centers, and other critical infrastructure. The third layer would contain election-operation information, such as the status of polling centers, election personnel, equipment, and logistics. The fourth layer would function as a decision and coordination mechanism involving the appropriate election, disaster or conflict management, government, and emergency authorities. The final layer would communicate appropriate warnings and instructions to field personnel, local officials, communities, and the public through reliable communication channels.
Thus, an effective MHEWS achieves operational success when the ERN’s physical conflict metrics, weather forecasts, the IEMC-BARMM’s digital tracking, and NAMFREL's mechanical integrity logs converge into a unified data dashboard, enabling the rapid-response coordination required to preserve the democratic integrity of the BARMM political transition.
Pre-election acts prohibited by Comelec are covered
Certainly, the EWER applies explicitly to acts before and during the election that are strictly prohibited under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and relevant COMELEC resolutions. They will focus on election integrity and their operational parameters are directly designed to observe, document, and report these statutory violations to ensure a clean process.
In the pre-election phase and into the eve of the election, the system actively tracks illegal partisan behavior, such as unlawful campaigning after the official deadline, and monitors compliance with statutory bans on the unauthorized release of public funds, last-minute public works disbursements, and violations of the standard liquor ban.
On election day, the Multihazard Early Warning System (MHEWS) pivots heavily toward documenting criminal electoral offenses, with digital and physical tracking teams from organizations like the Incident Early Warning and Monitoring Center (IEMC-BARMM) monitoring both traditional cash distributions and digital wallet transfers for vote-buying and vote-selling violations.
Concurrently, the Early Response Network (ERN) tracks violations of the COMELEC gun ban and the use of unauthorized armed bodyguards, while ground monitors document instances of voter coercion, clan-driven forced block-voting, and unlawful electioneering within the prohibited 30-meter radius of polling places.
While civic watchdogs like NAMFREL, LENTE, and the ERN do not possess law-enforcement powers, their formal partnership agreements with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) ensure that documented violations are compiled into legally actionable dossiers. This evidentiary pipeline enables prompt legal investigations and the prosecution of election offenses under the exclusive jurisdiction of COMELEC.
Authorities are expected to have predefined procedures explaining what should happen when a particular warning level is reached, specially during election. For example, if forecasts indicate that heavy rainfall could cause flooding near several polling centers, election officials and local disaster management authorities could review transportation routes, identify alternative access routes, check communication systems, pre-position emergency resources, and coordinate with field personnel before roads become impassable. The objective is to shift from a reactive approach, where authorities respond only after a disaster has disrupted election operations, to an anticipatory approach in which authorities take preventive measures based on credible forecasts and risk information.
Voters-centered election early warning system
As an important disaster-risk and election-resilience mechanism for BARMM in 2026, its value lies not merely in providing warnings but in transforming information into timely and coordinated action. By integrating hazard monitoring, GIS-based risk assessment, impact forecasting, election logistics, local government information, emergency response, and accessible public communication, the system can help reduce the effects of disasters on voters and election personnel while supporting the continuity and safety of electoral operations. For the first regular BARMM Parliamentary Election, the ultimate objective should be to ensure that environmental and emergency hazards do not unnecessarily prevent people from safely participating in the democratic process.
A people-centered early-warning system should consider not only election infrastructure but also the safety and accessibility of voters. Particular attention may be given to elderly persons, persons with disabilities, geographically isolated communities, communities with limited transportation, and populations living in hazard-prone areas. If a serious hazard is expected, authorities could provide appropriate public-safety information and coordinate with local disaster management organizations to ensure that voters and election personnel are not unnecessarily exposed to dangerous conditions. The objective should be to protect people's safety while preserving their ability to participate in the electoral process.
This strengthens election resilience by connecting scientific hazard information with election operations and local community needs in monitoring hazards, detecting threats, forecasting potential impacts, assessing exposed populations and infrastructure, communicating warnings, taking early action, monitoring the response, and learning from the results. It can also help authorities move from simply asking whether a hazard is occurring to determining how that hazard will affect particular communities, polling centers, transportation routes, election personnel, and voters.
References
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princeton University Press. US.
ANFREL (july 30, 2026). ANFREL-NDI Joint Pre-Campaign Statement on the 2026 BARMM Parliamentary Elections | Pre-Campaign Statement. https://anfrel.org/anfrel-ndi-joint-pre-campaign-statement-on-the-2026-barmm-parliamentary-elections/?fbclid=IwY2xjawUJ_MdwZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjExAGJyaWQRMW53aUcwb1R2ZzNHSG1adGNzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeYn9jzTcgkhRs3DLjYE8dur2JH396rR2bHdBussLJRPZ6QgoPGvWEgd88y8I_aem_MQern_e4lcQ-Ro7Mko62gw
Asian Network for Free Elections. (2026). Make it worth the wait: LENTE's statement on the historic September 14 BARMM parliamentary elections. anfrel.org
Bangsamoro Government. (2026, September 7). BARMM, security forces finalize preparations ahead of parliamentary elections. Bangsamoro Government. https://bangsamoro.gov.ph/
BusinessMirror. (2026, September 7). BARMM election: Critical test of region's political transition. businessmirror.com.ph
Buenaventura, Tomas (May 9, 2025). Clan violence in the Southern Philippines: Rido threatens elections and peace in Bangsamoro. ACLED. https://acleddata.com/report/clan-violence-southern-philippines-rido-threatens-elections-and-peace-bangsamoro
Buenaventura, Tomas (July 2025). The Philippines: Rivalries Between Local Elite in The Philippines Fuel Violence. ACLED. https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-rivalries-between-local-elite-philippines-fuel-violence
Cabalza, Dexter (Aug 03, 2026). Reported violence in BARMM not election-related, Palace says. https://www.inquirer.net/483215/reported-violence-in-barmm-not-election-related-palace-says/
CCAA (Sept 13, 2026). A Vote for the Future: The Bangsamoro's critical step toward democracy. https://conflictalert.info/our-work/bulletins/60/a-vote-for-the-future-the-bangsamoros-critical-step-toward-democracy?fbclid=IwY2xjawUTXM9wZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMURGc3puSEdZSlV3Z2hpVlFzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeN7xUe0rlcjeMGCRmDMfcwzsDVCl6EocgCTvBrAsVRdlKEHMlCiSmmWBfrBs_aem_x_uotC8hiICJuPIAfTBrKg and https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1DKZ35VviA/
CCAA and ERN Election Monitoring (Aug 13-31, 2026). Bangsamoro at a Crossroads: Persistent violence and socioeconomic challenges loom over the first Parliamentary election. Boto Mo Bangsamoro! Bulletin No. 3 CCAA and ERN election monitoring, Philippines, pp. 1-5.
Cabrera, Ferdinand B. (Sept 13, 2026). COMELEC issues show cause order to former chair Sheriff Abas to explain alleged ‘vote-buying’, MindaNews, https://mindanews.com/top-stories/2026/09/comelec-issues-show-cause-order-to-former-chair-sheriff-abas-to-explain-alleged-vote-buying/
Carreon, Frencie (Sept 13, 2026). Businessman, bystander wounded in Lamitan City shooting. MindaNews. https://mindanews.com/c3-news/2026/09/businessman-bystander-wounded-in-lamitan-city-shooting/
Cagayan, Amiel (July 09, 2026). Nearly 600 families displaced by floods in Maguindanao del Norte town. Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2260810/nearly-600-families-displaced-by-floods-in-maguindanao-del-norte-town?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwY2xjawUJ8p1wZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjExAGJyaWQRMW53aUcwb1R2ZzNHSG1adGNzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe_eKcMcCieVQrwHh_bbCZcQPZdp9DIFSvBfkWHrFo0n5kd2lpSeA0an8J9sY_aem_zp-__iSpd7VIY8M_KTaLHg
Capuno, Joseph J. (2017). Violent conflicts in ARMM: Probing the factors related to local political, identity, and shadow-economy hostilities, UPSE Discussion Paper, No. 2017-07, University of the Philippines, School of Economics (UPSE), Quezon City. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/202515/1/1014839122.pdf
CrisisGroup. (March 10, 2026). Peace in the Philippines: The Bangsamoro’s Moment of Truth . ttps://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/asia-pacific/philippines/355-peace-philippines-bangsamoros-moment-truth?fbclid=IwY2xjawUHNDtwZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMWJHVHJ2SW4xSDRWam50cXlzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe9X3_AzT7qXzfn9hl2sMgh5DDBK_RylDO9CY4714JZMpSPV_wyZqQhfMLqFc_aem_s-Y4VoocibHVpF6wY1HcTw
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563–595. https://doi.org
Commission on Elections. (1985). Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). comelec.gov.ph
Deinla, Imelda; Ballar, Kier Jesse; Refani, Renner Paul Peralta; and Yap, Jurel (Feb 2022). Election-Related Violence in the Philippines: Trends, Targets, and Perpetrators. Ateneo School of Government. ASOG WORKING PAPER 22-005. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359688766_Election-Related_Violence_in_the_Philippines_Trends_Targets_and_Perpetrators
Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press. US.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper & Row. US.
Held, D. (2006). Models of democracy (3rd ed.). Stanford University Press. US.
Inquirer.net. (2026, July 20). Security intensified in 27 red-category areas ahead of BARMM polls. Inquirer.net. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2266706/security-intensified-in-27-red-category-areas-ahead-of-barmm-polls
Inquirer.net. (2026, July 25). Army deploys battalion for BARMM election security. Inquirer.net. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/
International Repubican Institute (Advancing Democracy Worldwide) (Sept 9, 2026). IRI Announces Arrival of Delegation to Observe Parliamentary Elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. https://www.iri.org/news/iri-announces-arrival-of-delegation-to-observe-parliamentary-elections-in-the-bangsamoro-autonomous-region-in-muslim-mindanao/
Institute for Autonomy and Governance. (2026). Boots on the ground, hands on the keyboard: IEMC-BARMM mobilizes to safeguard the region’s first parliamentary elections. iag.org.ph
Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity. (2026, April 30). “Safe and Secure” 2026 BARMM, BSKE elections. PeaceGovPH. https://peace.gov.ph/2026/04/safe-and-secure-2026-barmm-bske-elections/
Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity. (2026, May 18). Statement of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity Sec. Mel Senen Sarmiento on the upcoming first Parliamentary Bangsamoro Elections. PeaceGovPH. https://peace.gov.ph/2026/05/statement-of-the-presidential-adviser-on-peace-reconciliation-and-unity-sec-mel-senen-sarmiento-on-the-upcoming-first-parliamentary-bangsamoro-elections/
Manila Times (July 17, 2026). BARMM govt must address clan violence. https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/07/17/opinion/editorial/barmm-govt-must-address-clan-violence/2386103?fbclid=IwY2xjawUKA5JwZG9mBWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMTdSdTZDWkk1VU96QmVFUEJzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeJjWV81Ja0Go6a74gEG9Xs20srE6UNt4e2TEmOFxUBabQvy2abCNPborO7vE_aem_ypn7B213rS9Y3jRXZSQYRw
Muhs, Lena (January 2022). Protection of Non-Moro Indigenous Peoples in BARMM, Forum ZfD, Philippines. pp. 1-2.
Mindanao Weather Update (September 12, 2026). BARMM Election Weather Update (Forecast sourced from PAG-ASA DOST). https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19dVKybkQM/
PAGASA-DOST (Sept 13, 2026) . Mindanao Weather forecast. https://www.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/regional-forecast/minprsd
Patinio, Ferdinand (Aug 10, 2026). Inclement weather may postpone BARMM polls, Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1281485
Philippine National Police. (2026, July 20). PNP beefs up operations in red category areas ahead of BARMM polls. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1279810
Philippine News Agency. (2026, August 27). PNP bolsters BARMM security ahead of historic parliamentary elections. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph/
SunStar. (2026, August 11). PNP to deploy more police personnel for BARMM polls. SunStar. https://www.sunstar.com.ph/
Sitchon, John (Sept 3, 2026). BARMM polls: Maguindanao del Norte a key regional battleground. Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/.../barmm-polls-2026-electoral.../
Timonera, Bobby (Set. 13, 2026). Day before elections. MindaNews. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Bfu3u1sRG/
Umel, Richel (Sept 14, 2026). Checking Preparation. MindaNews. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19WdDTC3dR/
