Exec. Order 70: anxieties in the peace fronts
President Rodrigo Duterte signed Executive Order No. 70 on December 4, 2018.
This EO provides for the institutionalization of the “whole-of-nation” approach in attaining inclusive and sustainable peace, creating a national task force to end local communist armed conflict, and directing the adoption of a National Peace Framework.
The EO defines this National Peace Framework as an embodiment of “principles, policies, plans, programs, for inclusive and sustainable peace; address the root causes of insurgencies, internal disturbances and tensions as well as other armed conflicts and threats in identified areas. It will include a mechanism for localized peace engagements or negotiations and interventions that is nationally orchestrated, directed, supervised, while being locally implemented.”
This Whole-of-A-Nation as an approach is inspired on the Joint Communique of the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila on August 5, 2017 which posits the process “as an alternate to purely military option in combating terrorism and violent extremism.”
Bases for institutionalization
On a constructive side, EO 70 cited Article 2 of Philippine Constitution which upholds the state principles on (a) the renunciation of war as a national policy; (b) maintenance of peace and order, protection of liberty and property, promotion of general welfare; and,(c ) promoting just and dynamic social order that will ensure prosperity and independence of nation and poverty through delivery of adequate services, employment, standard of living, and quality life.
It recognized Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 as a blueprint in attaining inclusive and sustainable peace through intensified development and other peace-building initiatives in conflict-affected and vulnerable communities.
It cited that “internal socio-political stability rests upon healing the rifts that divide the nation by promoting participatory governance, synergy of government development efforts, and enhancing the participation and responsibilities of local government units.”
It mandates too of reframing and refocusing government policy to achieve inclusive and sustainable peace by recognizing that insurgencies, internal disturbances and tensions, and other armed conflicts and threats are not only military and security concerns but as symptomatic of broader social, economic, and historical problems, such as poverty, historical injustices, social inequality, and lack of inclusivity, among others.
It further explicated that this whole-nation-approach prioritizes the “harmonization of delivery of basic services and social development packages by the government, facilitate societal inclusivity, and ensure active participation of all sectors of the society in the pursuit of the country’s peace agenda.”
The foregoing provisions are highly acceptable.
On a critical point, EO 70 also integrated Executive Order No. 16 (2017) which adopted the National Security Policy 2017-2022 that calls to end all armed threats in the Philippines.
This is where anxiety and confusion set in.
EO 16 contained broader principles on national security management and its strategies with objectives specifically targetting to end the longest running insurgency of the country waged by 4,000 alleged communist guerillas.
Task Force Operational Structure
EO 70 mandated the creation of a National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict as a mechanism and structure for the implementation of the Whole-of-Nation approach; ensure “comprehensive orchestration of related peace efforts and initiatives of the national government agencies; local government units; and various sectors of civil society.”
It requires “formulation of National Peace Framework which will include among others a mechanism for local peace engagements or negotiations and interventions.”
The National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict will be composed of the following:
1. The President as chairperson
2. National Security Adviser (as vice chair)
3. Secretaries of DILG, DoJ, DND, DPWH, DBM, DoF, DAR, DSWD, DepEd, NEDA, NICA, TESDA, PAPPRU, PA for IPs’ Concerns, chief of staff of AFP, director general of PNP, chair of NCIP, Presidential Communications Operations Office; and two (2) representatives from the private sector which will serve a term of one (1) year each and will be subject to the appointive power of the president upon the recommendation of the Task Force. The private sector representatives may designate an alternate representative but must be with a rank not lower than as assistant secretary and duly authorized by original or prior appointees. These alternates names ought to be submitted to the national secretariat.
Functions of the Task Force
Within 6 months from issuance of the EO, the TF should have started its coordination with national government agencies, LGUs, CSO, and other stakeholders. It must ensure inter-agency convergence in the implementation of the framework in conflict-affected and vulnerable communities.
The EO also expressed that “all enlisted departments, bureau, office, agency, government instrumentality, GOCCs, state universities and colleges must help the TF in accordance to their respective mandates in the implementation of the framework.”
Like an organization, the TF will also “evaluate, define, modify, or integrate policies, programs and activities contained in the framework.”
The task force will also organize its national secretariat which will be headed by an executive director (rank of undersecretary) with its personnel from member agencies of the Task Force under secondment, detailing, or other arrangement.
Anxieties in all fronts
Beyond the parameters of the EO 70, anxieties and confusion surged high among peace communities and institutions.
To reckon, the president had just formally terminated the peace process with the National Democratic Front/CPP and series of violence have transpired in various regions causing displacement of residents, particularly the indigenous constituents living in the margins and conflict zones. If the government will pursue localization of peace process at the community level, its modalities are yet vague and implementing mechanisms are unarticulated.
Reports of summary execution among suspected top CPP leaders, negotiators, and even parliamentarians were evident in the last few years as formal peace talk was stalled. Hence, human rights, human dignity, and clamor for both personal and social justice remained a national issue too.
Further, the Task Force's structures are observably laden with nine offices led by either active or/but retired generals and there is apparent exclusion of civil society’s participation in the decision-making processes. I am particularly interested on who are involved in the drafting on the National Peace Framework? Is this already drafted? What about the civilian and humanitarian character of the peace process?
While EO 16 (2017) cited the primacy of the peace process and recognized “civilian authority over military forces” however, EO 70 effectively put PAPPRU (Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, Reconciliation and Unity) as another singular institution within the entire TF and likely, its mandates will be a mere subsidiary of the entire counter insurgency measures. I say “measures” because task force is technically designed for short-term and tactical purposes; never strategic in its resolved though it may identify itself with various strategies under EO 16.
Moreover, the civil society-- consistently in the front line of humanitarian action and which have acculturated dialogues, participation, and negotiations for peaceful conflict transformation-- are not integrated as part of the task force’s structure. Although a token provision of the EO encouraged civil society and non-government to take part in peacebuildings but these are presumably to be an undertaken outside and independent from the created national mechanism. Collaboration is truly wanting.
Indigenous peace community: talk to us
In a statement by Lumad Husay Mindanao (LHM) and the Independent IP Peace Panel, then supported by OPAPP under the management of Jesus Dureza, the group appealed for the following in the face of EO 70:
1. We appeal to the President to talk to us. Please talk to us who are not part of this war. Please talk to the rest of the indigenous peoples who have broader picture of the complexities of the situation. Talk to other victims and survivors who are not allied with the CAFGUs and paramilitary units of the military, nor hired as SCAAs to secure LGUs and corporations, nor recruited as Pulang Baganis of the CPP/NDF/NPA, nor employed in private armies of political warlords -- we are more than them in numbers. We are a greater bulk of the indigenous peoples who are caught in the crossfire and who have also been illegally detained, tortured, and killed due to this protracted conflict.
2. We offer the Husay principle and pursue an IP-led peace process. Let the cultural process redeem us when the political realm fails. Let the national dialogue process start with the divided communities first, among indigenous communities across the islands. This process will be territorial-based, held to cleanse the damage done in our own ancestral domains in the many years of strife. We propose to transform this process in EO 70 to build bridges and bring peoples across various divides by allowing us to talk first among each other, tribal and inter-tribal. Before we talk with the rest of the Filipinos in a dialogue among equals.
3. We assert the principle of “free, prior, and informed consent” residing in every genuine governing tribal council and indigenous political structure be recognized and respected by this national process. The indigenous peoples and our territories shed blood in this armed conflict -- and our lives, rights, and processes matter. This proposed “localized peace process” will have to be inclusive in the kind of consultation the national task force will pursue. The indigenous peoples should be not used for whatever gains, and tribal leaders with mandates from their councils and communities should be the ones heard at the table -- and not the agencies nor the private sector who can’t speak on behalf of us and of our suffering.
4. We urge that the rights and agenda of the indigenous peoples should be key electoral and policy agenda. Immediate policy reforms addressing the rising cost of rice, food, other basic commodities and promoting policy alternatives on issues on land, agrarian reform, human rights, food, and human security should be the change agenda committed by all relevant policy actors and electoral candidates. These should benefit the indigenous peoples and the rest of the poor communities in the cities and rural areas.
5. The pushback of extended martial law in Mindanao reached our indigenous territories with the rising incidents of forced evacuation and extrajudicial killing resulting to a climate of fear and impunity -- notwithstanding the continued operation of extractive large-scale mining operations, agricultural plantation and the distribution of of CLOA on ancestral domains/lands with pending delineation processes of CADT/CALTs.
